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INTRODUCTION
For program administration and for policy purposes, savings data are fundamental to the
Children and Youth Savings Account Policy Demonstration (CYSAPD). Whether or not the
researchers also need the data, programs must track how much each participant has saved and
how much is to be disbursed in matching funds.
Of particular relevance for the administration and evaluation of the American Dream
Demonstration (ADD) of Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) was the development of
MIS IDA, a management information system designed by the Center for Social Development.
Yet, for CYSAPD, a tracking system other than MIS IDA may be the best choice. ADD
suggests that programs sometimes have difficulty tracking savings data, and another system may
(1) be easier for programs to run (because they will be responsible for less tracking); (2) show
how a program could be run by institutions capable of running a national policy. This paper
contrasts the differences between ADD and the proposal for CYSAPD regarding savings
deposits, incentive structure, and management information systems.
SAVINGS DEPOSITS
ADD assumes that most deposits in IDAs come from the adult participants themselves. In
CYSAPD, a much larger share of deposits—especially for children—are likely to come from
someone other than the child or youth, for example parents, grandparents, or third parties such as
501(c)(3) organizations.
The third-party distinction matters because the participant does not control the presence or access
of such contributions. Just as in ADD, some programs had higher match rates than others simply
because they were more successful in raising funds.
In ADD, third-party contributions are used to match the savings of participants. Match dollars
are always kept separate from the participant deposits. In effect, the participant has two
accounts. The participant establishes one account, and—using MIS IDA—the sponsoring
organization tracks separately third-party match dollars (held in a single account) for each
participant. The sponsoring organization provides match dollars to the approved vendor at the
time of asset purchase.
In CYSAPD, as in ADD, the research focuses on the savings behavior of the participant and
his/her family, independent of whatever third parties happen to do. Thus, to optimize the lessons
learned for CYSAPD policy and research, contributions related to the participant (the child or
youth, parents, or grandparents) must be tracked separately from third party contributions.
Schreiner (2001) describes several measures of financial savings in CYSAPD.
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INCENTIVE STRUCTURE
An essential topic for CYSAPD is the incentive structure. It has been suggested that an
alternative to the incentive used in ADD may be more useful for CYSAPD participants and also
provide a better fit for to-scale policy implementation. In CYSAPD, there are two possible thirdparty incentive structures: match and additive.
The match incentive is demonstrated in ADD. For example, for every x dollars the participant
saves, a match of $y multiplied by $x is contributed. The match rate may vary among programs
in ADD, but the typical rate is 2:1.
ADD’s incentive structure matches the balance of the participant’s account within any given
statement period (as opposed to matching the deposits in a given period). In addition, there are
calculations to limit matching based on time caps and dollar maximums.
An additive incentive is a fixed dollar amount that may or may not be related to saving. For
example, an achievement-based additive incentive may be tied to graduation from high school, a
specific grade-point average, or honor-roll attainment. On the other hand, the additive incentive
may be savings-based. For example, a participant may receive a third-party fixed contribution
for enrolling in CYSAPD via an automatic deposit program. By electing to automatically
deposit contributions, the participant has made a financial commitment to monthly saving.
Research indicates that a participant is less likely to drop out of an IDA program if savings are
deposited automatically (Grinstein-Weiss et al., 2001; Schreiner et al., 2001). Another example
of an additive incentive may be the receipt of a third-party contribution based on net savings
during a given year (ie. if the participant’s end of year balance is $x or greater, then $y is
deposited).
For CYSAPD, sponsoring organizations may either design their programs to provide match or
additive incentives for the benefit of the participant. However, the simplest, and therefore
recommended incentive is additive. CYSAPD programs may be more likely to use additive
incentives for the following reasons: (1) youth have little money of their own to deposit, and an
additive incentive may not be dependent on such contributions; (2) school-based performance
may be emphasized, tying contributions to achievements; (3) match calculations are not
necessary, simplifying the account management; thus, additive incentives may be easier to
operate on a national scale.
MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS
Fundamental to the success of CYSAPD is the selection and use of a simple and effective
standardized management system. The choice of a system will be dictated by program and
monitoring design, which is in turn dictated by research and policy goals.
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One possible goal for CYSAPD is to pilot a program that can go to scale. From this perspective,
program design should be compatible with current systems that can support nationwide
participation, such as 401(k) plans. Current possibilities for to-scale systems include a system in
development, Doorways to Dreams (D2D), or a college savings-plan system.
D2D OnLine IDA. Developed by the Harvard Business School in partnership with D2D Fund
and SunGard, D2D is a prototype modified 401k system designed to handle account management
for IDAs (Johnson et al., 2001). However, D2D is still in the design phase and it is questionable
whether it will be available and tested for CYSAPD sites across the country by the start of this
demonstration. At this time, it does not appear that D2D is a viable option for CYSAPD.
Thus, the CYSAPD management information system options are:

Option

College saving-plan
accounting

1

✓
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✓

MIS IDA
✓

College savings-plan accounting systems. A college savings plan is an investment plan
operated by a state designed to help families save for future post-secondary education costs. A
professional money manager, such as TIAA-CREF or Fidelity Investments, typically provides a
centralized accounting system for each state’s program. Clancy (2001) discusses college savings
plans in detail and presents the implications for CYSAPD.
If the focus of CYSAPD is on parents saving for a child’s education, and for teens interested in
saving for post-secondary education, then college saving plans are recommended as the saving
vehicle (Option 1). In this case, a separate system—such as MIS IDA—will not be required of
the sponsoring organizations for tracking savings data (Clancy, 2001); however, a
companion system will be necessary to collect demographic characteristics.
An
additiveincentive structure may be best suited for college savings plans.
Option 1 supports saving only for post-secondary education. A second option is to use both
college savings plans and a system that can accommodate other approved saving uses, such as
MIS IDA. It may be impractical for a single site to operate two separate systems; therefore, the
experimental sites could use college savings plans and all other sites could use either MIS IDA
or college savings plans to track savings information in CYSAPD.
MIS IDA. While MIS IDA provides flexibility for tracking a variety of intended uses, the
system is not capable of demonstrating scale (Johnson et al., 2001). Furthermore, the use of MIS
IDA by CYSAPD may depend on the saving incentive structure selected. The current MIS IDA
accounting function is a match, not an additive, incentive structure.
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MIS IDA may be revised to accommodate an additive incentive structure, and will also require
revisions to track participant characteristics tailored to CYSAPD (Clancy, Johnson & Schreiner,
2001).1
SUMMARY
How will savings data be collected and what will be the incentive structure for CYSAPD? The
response to this question may influence the amount of effort organizations spend collecting data,
and may also impact the selection of the appropriate monitoring system. Two systems options
are proposed. The recommended model for scale is college savings plans; the system is
currently available nationwide and account management is handled by the college savings plan
money manager. Discussion regarding demonstration goals, incentive structures, and approved
uses of accounts will determine the selection of an appropriate system for CYSAPD.
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A modified version of MIS IDA may be used to only collect demographic information at all sites.
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